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A B S T R A C T   
In 2013, President Xi Jinping formulated China’s vision of Eurasian connectivity: The Silk Road Economic Belt. The strategy envisages the construction of infra-
structure networks that will enmesh the Eurasian continent and form an interconnected space of exchange. Since the plan was announced, the Economic Belt has 
attracted much academic and media attention in terms of the infrastructure being built and its future potentialities. At the same time, questions about the sus-
tainability of this infrastructure in a dynamic Sino–Inner Asian borderland, with its highly fluid terrain and socio-political geography, have been virtually absent from 
the debate. 
The inevitable decay, maintenance and social ambiguity surrounding transport infrastructure lack the appeal associated with new construction projects; yet, 
discussing them is crucial in the context of mega initiatives such as the Economic Belt. It is important to bring it back ‘down to the ground’ and into more mundane 
terms. By zooming in on a single desert road in northwest China that has been designated as a crucial conduit in the westward arc of the Economic Belt, this article 
draws attention to the social complexity and ecological vulnerability of transport infrastructure in the Sino–Inner Asian borderlands. At one scale, this infrastructure 
is part of China’s vision of globalization; at another scale, however, it is firmly embedded in local contexts. By pushing the political, ecological and material 
complexity of road maintenance to the centre of our inquiry, the article offers a new perspective on the current construction boom and its sustainability.   
It seems that every wannabe grand president feels the need to launch 
a grand infrastructure project. Upon completing his ascent to power in 
2013, China’s President Xi Jinping has thus done exactly what so many 
other technocratic, modernist rulers have done before him: launch a 
spectacular infrastructure initiative. Referred to as the Belt and Road 
Initiative (一带一路, Yidai yilu), this is set to transform East, Inner and 
South Asia, the Middle East and Europe into an interconnected space of 
exchange.2 The networks of infrastructure – roads, railways, seaports, 
pipelines – are to embrace the Eurasian continent and ‘break the con-
nectivity bottleneck’ in Asia.3 Since the plan was announced, the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) and the connectivity it promises have attracted 
huge international attention. That promise of new connectivity, and the 
nearly magical powers ascribed to transport infrastructure to generate 
peace and prosperity, and to unite the states and people along the 
Economic Belt, are at the very core of the Chinese discourse around it 
(Li, 2015; NDRC 2015). In the new strategy, western China, where most 
of the domestic investment related to the BRI flows into new transport 
infrastructures, has acquired a novel form of centrality (Rippa, 2017, p. 
17). Typically labelled ‘backward’ (落后, luohou) in the past, western 
China is now defined as the ‘core area’ (核心区, hexinqu), a ‘leading 
edge’ (前沿, qianyan), a ‘bridgehead’ (桥头堡, qiaotoubao) and also as a 
‘gateway’ (关道, guandao) for China’s economy and enterprises to 
‘expand out’ (走出去, zouchuqu) into the global arena (Sidaway and 
Chih, 2017: 594; Xinhua 2015). 
Since the launch of the Open Up the West programme in 2000, China 
has invested massively in long-distance transport infrastructure con-
necting eastern provinces and the long-underfunded western and 
northern border regions. Parallel to this, the scope of China’s infra-
structural activities has expanded on an unprecedented scale into the 
territories of its neighbours. Since 2013, all the projects in the westward 
arc have been discursively subsumed under the label of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt (丝绸之路经济带, Sichouzhilu jingjidai), which together 
with the Maritime Silk Road makes up the BRI. While China has been 
intent on these construction efforts in order to enhance its GDP and 
create technological, labour, resource, capital and political de-
pendencies across Eurasia (Clarke, 2017; Yu, 2017), questions of the 
fragility of the connectivity that this infrastructure is to establish, as well 
as the practicalities and politics of infrastructure maintenance, are 
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virtually absent from the debate. For example, when we scan through 
the document ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ (NDRC 2015), we find 
the verb ‘maintain’ used once, albeit in a non-infrastructure context, and 
‘upkeep’ not used at all. On the other hand, ‘construct’/‘construction’ is 
used fourteen times, and ‘build’/‘building’ thirty-two times. In a further 
130-page BRI roadmap from 2017, ‘maintain’ is used four times (but 
only once in the context of infrastructure), while the words ‘build’/‘-
building’ are used sixty-five times, and ‘construct’/‘construction’ 
twenty-six times. The narrative is thus clearly oriented towards con-
struction and not at maintenance of what already exists or that which is 
currently under construction. In accordance with this discourse, maps of 
the Economic Belt, which have been continuously produced since the 
launch of the initiative, depict the roads and railways presently being 
built and those to be constructed as simple, bold lines across the 
Eurasian continent, as if they might be unaffected by security concerns, 
challenging topography and inevitable material decay (see Fig. 1). 
In contrast to maps, which focus on the geometrical linearity of 
connections, I theorize roads as complex bundles of social relations 
between, among others, humans, materials, capital, terrain, climate, 
discourses and the state.4 The shift of perspective from representations 
of roads as lines to bundles of interwoven social relations draws atten-
tion to the inherent liveliness of infrastructure as it is forged from dy-
namic entanglements between those multiple human and non-human 
agentive forces (Barry, 2013; Carse, 2017; Harvey & Knox, 2015; 
Schwenkel, 2015). Further, it is argued here that a focus on decay, the 
process of disintegration of these relations that make infrastructures, 
and maintenance – efforts to slow this process down and patch it up – 
provide fresh entry points for the critical discussion of China’s plans of 
Eurasian connectivity and the ideology of infrastructural modernity 
more generally, as they are both grounded in the assumption that 
infrastructure is stable and durable. While the BRI discourse is focused 
on building and constructing, here rather the contingency of the social 
relations on which any feat of infrastructure depends is emphasized, as 
well as the huge amount of work that must be invested to keep it up and 
running. 
Scholars from Science and Technology Studies and Urban Studies 
explicitly highlight the importance of the mundane work of upkeep and 
repair, work that is not prestigious but which is essential to keep the 
world around us going (Denis & Pontille, 2014; Graham & Thrift, 2007; 
Strebel, Bovet and Sormani, 2019). While the focus of repair and 
maintenance studies is on innovation, creativity and the mundane 
invisibility of upkeep, in this article I show that maintenance is also 
highly political and can be violent and contested (Barnes, 2017). Think, 
for instance, what it means to maintain the roads that the Chinese 
companies build for Pakistan through Kashmir – a territory claimed by 
both Pakistan and India. Moreover, because roads, canals and railways 
are typically read as materializations of the state (Anand, 2018; Ker-
naghan, 2012; Mostowlansky, 2017), their decay and the work of 
maintenance are also read as indexing the broadly understood condition 
of this very state, and of state–citizen relations (Chu, 2014; Flower, 
2004). 
The focus on the materiality of roads and the terrain in which they 
are embedded should underline the need to consider the challenges of 
infrastructure upkeep as we speculate on the potential geopolitical ef-
fects of the BRI. The second aim of this article is to connect to the debate 
on the increasingly blurred distinction between infrastructure and na-
ture (Hetherington, 2019). In China, which has a long tradition of 
implementing huge environmental-engineering projects, the distinction 
between infrastructure and nature might be blurred in different ways 
than those that accompany the current condition of the planet reflected 
in the term Anthropocene. Third, the story of a particular desert road 
and the disappearing river on which it depends, which I tell below, 
expands the argument for thinking roads and other infrastructures as 
inherently fragile. This fragility comes from the fact that infrastructures 
are always ‘doubly relational’: firstly, on the materials out of which they 
are built, and secondly, on the economic-political-environmental re-
lations in which their construction and maintenance are embedded 
(Harvey, Bruun Jensen, & Morita, 2017, p. 5). The last purpose of telling 
the story of the road and the river is to point to a multi-scalar colonial 
project initiated by the Chinese state in northwest China’s Xinjiang re-
gion in the early 1950s and which continues in a different guise today. 
1. Roads as lines VS. Roads as social relations 
In the fluid landscape of deserts and mountains that characterizes 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, northwest China, unmaintained 
roads disintegrate in less time than that needed for their construction. As 
in the neighbouring regions of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and also partially Kazakhstan, materials erode quickly there 
due to the dynamic topography, extreme climate and the socio-political 
complexity that further challenges the transport infrastructure’s capac-
ity to connect. Hence, just what a road – and any infrastructure for that 
matter – nominally is in such a landscape, what it is capable of doing and 
for how long, is an entirely open question. All infrastructure under 
construction here is an ‘as-yet-undefined mode of participation’ (Har-
vey, 2018: p. 99) and also non-participation, for example when infra-
structure crumbles together with the political-economic relations on 
which it has been dependent (Reeves, 2014; Mostowlansky, 2017). 
In the vision of the Silk Road Economic Belt, Xinjiang is a critical 
junction on westward land and sea routes. This arid region constitutes 
one sixth of all Chinese state territory and is located in a geopolitically 
strategic position at China’s borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang also 
shares an extensive border with Tibet, another conflict-ridden region, 
and is rich in natural resources such as oil, natural gas, coal, gold, ura-
nium and potash. Muslim, Turkic language-speaking Uyghurs, Kazakhs 
and Kyrgyz, with a combined population of 11.6 million, comprise the 
majority of the 21.8 million residents of Xinjiang.5 The Uyghurs, with 
more than 10 million inhabitants, are the region’s largest minzu,6 fol-
lowed by the Han Chinese (Toops, 2013; XWZCZ, 2005, p. 205). 
Southern Xinjiang, on which I focus here, is still a Uyghur-dominated 
region, despite concerted state efforts to increase the share of the Han 
population there. Southern Xinjiang has been a site of inter-ethnic and 
anti-state violence rooted in the fact that the multiple claimants to the 
region have very different views of ‘what should be done with [it], how 
people should act while there, and who should be allowed to live there’ 
(Blu, 1996; compare: Bovingdon, 2010; Cliff, 2012). Following Chinese 
media reports on Islamic radicalization of southern Xinjiang, and the 
increasing stake that the Chinese state has in the region with regard to 
the BRI, surveillance, security expenses and repression have seen a steep 
rise. A grid-like management of urban areas, a totalitarian control of the 
everyday life of the Uyghurs and other Muslim inhabitants of the region, 
and large-scale detention camps where Uyghurs and increasingly also 
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are extra-judicially incarcerated have been intro-
duced throughout the region on a large scale since 2017 (Zenz and 
4 For other studies that discuss roads as such fields of engagement, see for 
example, Campbell, 2012; Harvey & Knox, 2015; Jackson, 2015a; Carse, 2017). 
5 On the Uyghur, who constitute the majority population in southern Xin-
jiang, see, for example, Bell�er-Hann, Ildiko, & Cristina Ces, 2007; Bovingdon, 
2010; Thum, 2014.  
6 Minzu are officially designated population categories in China; there are 56 
of them. Minzu is translated either as ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’ (in Stalinist terms, 
which inspired this classification), or more recently and increasingly, especially 
in the official nomenclature, as ‘ethnic group’ or simply ‘minority’ in order to 
sever the association between the Chinese minzu and Soviet ‘nationalities’, 
many of which formed their own states after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. 
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Leibold, 2017; Zenz, 2018). The way in which Xinjiang has turned into 
an open-air prison for its Muslim inhabitants over the past few years 
directly counters the official rhetoric of opening up and facilitated cir-
culation with which China infuses the discourse on the BRI. In southern 
Xinjiang, the practice shows rather that the state is determined to 
expand its social-spatial control, for instance through hundreds of 
roadside checkpoints. While Han Chinese travellers are generally treated 
benevolently and are able to pass through the checkpoints even without 
an ID card, Uyghurs and foreigners have their IDs painstakingly scanned 
and registered at every checkpoint, are prevented from travelling 
without an official reason and also prohibited from taking some of the 
roads and entering certain cities. Uyghurs (and foreigners alike) often 
have no choice but to stay put, also because those with non-local IDs are 
exposed to an even greater scrutiny. Those few Uyghurs who are able to 
do so fly, to spare themselves the fuss of travelling along all those newly 
built, smooth asphalt roads which government policy makes unavailable 
to them. 
The lines of roads on maps of the Economic Belt that are produced by 
various national and multinational agencies conceal the many ways in 
which uncertainty and discrimination remain inherent elements of 
mobility in this region of Asia. Representations of roads as continuous, 
apparently accessible-to-all, non-valorized lines can thus be, variously, a 
claim, a fantasy, a desire or a trick. In the practice of ‘travelling’ (Clif-
ford, 1992), these lines are accessible only to some. They are entangled 
with ethnicity, gender, household registration (户口, hukou), employ-
ment and more, each producing specific, stratified geographies of 
mobility (Chan & Zhang, 1999; Cresswell and Merriman, 2011; Selwyn, 
2001; Utang and Cresswell, 2008). As Anna Tsing pertinently observes, 
‘how we run depends on what shoes we are given to run in’ (2005, p. 5). 
Thus, differentiated mobility regimes have to be reflected on when roads 
and travel are discussed (Alff, 2016; Dalakoglou, 2010; Joniak-Lüthi, 
2016a; Kernaghan, 2012). Another thing that impacts how people, 
objects and information move is of course the materiality of transport 
infrastructure. Because materials incessantly erode, infrastructure 
inevitably decays. In southern Xinjiang, roads are regularly blocked by 
shifting sand, strong wind and snow, are hardly passable in dusty 
weather, and frequently destroyed by seasonal floods and landslides. 
Upon leaving the realm of cartographic representation, the smoothness 
of transportation lines crumbles. This manifested in the frequent 
occurrence of the conjunction ‘if’ in conversations about mobility during 
my fieldwork. These tended to be accompanied by statements such as ‘If 
the tunnel is open, we’ll be there in the evening’, or ‘If the road is 
flooded, we’ll have to sleep somewhere on the way’.7 Travel-related 
conversations appeared particularly prone to the conditional. 
Hence, while the construction of infrastructure itself is a challenge in 
southern Xinjiang, I rather want to focus here on what happens after the 
construction teams wrap up their work and leave. Examination of the 
mundane social life of roads reveals the complexity of the relations that 
have to be orchestrated for any road to last and provide connectivity. 
Regular breaks in traffic along the Karakoram Highway, the only road 
between China and Pakistan, are but one example, showing the fragility 
of connectivity in regions where traffic depends on just a few roads. This 
fragility radiates further, onto other infrastructural projects. The oil 
pipeline that is to connect the Pakistani port of Gwadar and eastern 
China via Xinjiang will greatly depend for maintenance on high-altitude 
roads like the Karakoram Highway and desert roads through southern 
Xinjiang. In the discourse on the Silk Road Economic Belt, Xinjiang’s 
Fig. 1. Cartographic representations of the BRI. Sources: Top left: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative; Top 
right: https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2018/11/27/chinas-soft-development-strategy-belt-road-initiative/; Bottom left: https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/09/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-opens-up-unprecedented-opportunities/#3914dbe43e9a; Bottom right: https://medium. 
com/venture-views/risk-opportunities-singapores-role-in-china-s-bri-ff6377d035b7. 
7 The first conversation related to the crossing of Tengri Tagh/Tianshan 
Mountains from Kuqa to Narat, where we basically drove through a tunnel 
under construction. The other referred to the seasonal flooding of the southern 
section of the desert road that is the focus of this article. The road indeed turned 
out to be blocked for a few days, forcing us to stay overnight in military farms 
along the way (fieldwork material 2011–2012). 
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roads figure as simply a passage, a corridor along which people, re-
sources and other commodities will flow on their way to their destina-
tions. Needless to say, in the actual practice of travel, it is those very 
roads that determine whether things and people do indeed flow, or 
whether they get stuck. 
One such road is a 450 km section of the national highway (国道, 
guodao) no. 218 in southern Xinjiang (see Figs. 2 and 3). Like the Kar-
akoram Highway, this is a major link in the westward arc of the Eco-
nomic Belt. The area that the road crosses is extremely arid; it is the 
easternmost of the three existing desert highways (沙漠公路, shamo 
gonglu), which connect the northern and southern rims of the Takla-
makan Desert that occupies most of southern Xinjiang. The Tarim River, 
along which the road was originally built, acts as the border between the 
Taklamakan Desert to the west and the Kurugh Tagh Desert to the east. 
The road provides a connection between the oil city of Korla at its 
northern tip, the agricultural areas along the Tarim and Konchi/Kong-
que rivers,8 six regiments of the paramilitary Production and Con-
struction Corps (新疆生产建设兵团, Xinjiang Shengchan Jianshe 
Bingtuan9) in the desert along the road, oil extraction sites and the 
strategically crucial oasis of Charklik/Ruoqiang at its southern end. The 
small town of Charklik is the only natural oasis in this corner of Xinjiang 
and the only non-military settlement in a radius of several hundred 
kilometres. Charklik, and the no. 218 road which merges here with the 
highway that runs eastwards, are part of the ‘national defence line’ (国防 
, guofang xian). The two roads provide the shortest connection to 
deploy the army to southern Xinjiang and to China’s borders with India, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from inner China. 
They also form the shortest route for Han Chinese migrant workers to 
access southern Xinjiang. It is on water from the Kunlun Mountains that 
the oasis of Charklik with its mixed Uyghur, Hui/Dungan and Han 
population depend, and which makes human life and travel in this re-
gion possible at all. On the other hand, the town’s population, as well as 
the extractive industry and army installations located in the desert all 
depend on the desert road for transport. Thus, in the current political 
geography of northwest China, Charklik is a ‘bridgehead’10: it is essen-
tial to maintaining the material presence of the state – through roads, 
roadside checkpoints and military farms, among others – in this vast and 
extremely sparsely populated landscape (cf. Murton, 2017). Seen from 
the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt, Charklik sustains one of 
only two existing road arteries connecting eastern China, Xinjiang and 
the countries to the west. 
The history of (dis)connectivity along the desert road, which I 
introduce below, demonstrates the difficulty of understanding, let alone 
controlling, the relationship between infrastructure and the environ-
ment. In my discussion of this relationship and other relations that 
entwine in this road, I draw on primary Chinese-language sources, such 
as county gazetteers, maps, road and transportation annals, and gov-
ernment websites. This Chinese-language material represents a specific 
narrative, one that focuses on Yuan dynasty, Qing dynasty, Nationalist 
and Communist efforts to control this road. The second source of in-
formation is the conversations with Xinjiang Han and Uyghur scholars 
who have conducted research in the area along the road since the early 
2000s. These sources are further complemented by ethnographic ma-
terial I have collected when travelling on this road and staying in the 
settlements along it on multiple occasions during my ten months of 
fieldwork in Xinjiang in 2011–2012, and during a following fieldwork 
stay of three months in 2015–2016. 
2. Transitory materiality of the road 
The aim of the historical overview that follows is to shed light on 
roads as inherently lively objects. This liveliness is grounded in the 
contingency of the social, material, discursive and other relations of 
which they are a part. In the context of the Silk Road Economic Belt, the 
overview should contextualize the current construction boom in a long 
perspective of ongoing efforts to establish connectivity in this part of 
Asia, and draw attention to the ‘on-the-ground’ vulnerability of the in-
frastructures being built. Chinese border regions abound in ruins, the 
legacy of earlier developmental campaigns: villages to which people 
never moved, urban neighbourhoods that stand empty, development 
zones that have not attracted businesses and bombastic museums that do 
not house any exhibitions. These modern ruins suggest that construction 
in China is often linked to speculation, corruption and short-sighted 
megalomania (Kobi, 2016; Woodworth, 2012), with infrastructures 
not necessarily built to serve people but to create quick revenue and 
moments of splendour for politicians. Thus, the question that must be 
asked is: How many of the projects pursued in the name of the New Silk 
Road, as which the Economic Belt is sometimes referred to, will turn into 
similar modern ruins when the major thrust of the BRI is over? 
The region on which this article focuses was traversed by various 
communication routes in the past. From the second century BCE, one of 
the east–west trade routes between the Chinese Han Empire (206 
BCE–220 CE) and Transoxiana crossed this area, linking the ancient oases 
of Dunhuang, Miran and Loulan. When the shift of the Tarim and Konchi 
riverbeds in the fourth century CE left Loulan without water, the caravan 
route moved but continued to be used until the thirteenth century, when 
further climatic changes led to its abandonment. It was at about this time 
that the north–south route, the predecessor of today’s desert road, 
emerged. The Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) regarded it as 
important enough to set up postal stations along its length. Simple 
bridges were also built and ferry services on river crossings were 
established for the caravans of horses, donkeys and camels. The road is 
referred to in historical documents as the ‘officials’ road’ (官方大道, 
guanfang dadao) and was the main link connecting the southeast Tarim 
Basin to the outside world (RZBW, 1992, p. 214; YDBW, 1993, p. 173). 
The Mongols made attempts to pin this caravan path to the ground by 
establishing the postal stations; however, the fluid topography of wan-
dering sand dunes and meandering and seasonal rivers means that it 
would be a mistake to imagine any path as a fixed element of the terrain. 
Rather, the pathways were always shifting. The nineteenth-century ef-
forts of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911) to discipline the route 
make clear that its materiality remained difficult to control over the 
centuries. Under the Qing, the path was elevated where it crossed salty 
marshes, tamarisks were planted along its edges to prevent the path 
from disappearing and road signs were installed at intervals of 5–10 li 
(里).11 The Qing also established stations along the route to assure ease 
of communication and circulation of official documents. In 1884, with 
Xinjiang’s incorporation into the regular imperial administration, these 
stations were transformed into postal stations (YDBW, 1993, p. 173). 
Soon after, in 1891, settlement along the northern section of the path, 
beside the meandering Tarim and Konchi rivers, was initiated and 1,400 
Han Chinese families from outside Xinjiang were moved there to engage 
in agriculture (YDBW, 1993, p. 173). Imperial troops were also stationed 
along the path and small merchant colonies grew around postal stations 
to cater to soldiers and other travellers. Though the actual marks of the 
route in the terrain remained largely transitory, the connection did 
attract significant attention from the imperial authorities and attempts 
8 I provide both Uyghur- and Chinese-language versions of a toponym where 
it appears for the first time. Afterwards, I use Uyghur names.  
9 The Production and Construction Corps is a paramilitary organization with 
more than 2.5 million members, the overwhelming majority Han Chinese. The 
Corps combines military, agricultural and construction roles. It is independent 
from regional authorities and is under the direct jurisdiction of the central 
government. It has a strategic role in marking the presence of the Chinese state 
in Xinjiang, securing the borders as well as major watercourses and transport 
lines, and providing military backup in case of tensions.  
10 http://news.ts.cn/content/2015-04/29/content_11241457.htm. 11 These are 2.5–5 km. 
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were made to secure it, especially along the northern section, where 
some irrigated agriculture was possible. 
After the fall of the Qing empire in 1911, it appears that the route 
remained outside the immediate interest of the government of the young 
Republic of China until the early 1940s, when the government allocated 
substantial funds for the construction of a road between Korla and 
Charklik (XWZJSBW, 1992, pp. 64–6). For a lack of better material, the 
roughly 10,000 farmers mobilized to build it basically ‘wove’ a 4.5 
m-wide road from the branches of tamarisks, poplars, reeds and dogbane 
(XWZDBW, 1998, p. 110). However, as no maintenance was conducted, 
within a few years the disintegrating plant mat/road was repurposed as 
firewood by locals. 
In the first decade following the establishment of the People’s Re-
public of China in 1949, little changed in terms of technology and ma-
terials. Spontaneous construction efforts initiated by the local county 
governments alternated with phases of rapid decay. Pack animals, 
mainly horses and donkeys, and animal-pulled carts were the lynchpin 
of local transport, and thirty-five days was the approximate duration of 
the 900 km return journey between Korla and Charklik in the mid- 
1950s. Still, the path made it possible for Han Chinese settlers to 
advance into the desert along the Tarim river to ‘open up the wasteland’ 
(kaihuang) and set up the bridgeheads of Chinese Communist statehood. 
This is shown in the family story of Mr Zhao, a Han Chinese bus driver 
from Charklik, whose father settled there in 1955. Mr Zhao said: ‘The 
journey from Korla took my father fifteen days. He travelled on a cart 
pulled by a donkey, transporting a telegraph – a huge machine people 
have never seen here before. As a telegraph and radio operator, he was 
sent to establish and operate a telegraph station in [Charklik]. You know 
how it was back then, though he was not in the army, all the same he had 
no choice but to follow the state orders and settle here’ (Fieldwork 
interview, winter 2015). 
Despite poor travelling conditions, in 1956 a ‘regular’ postal and 
passenger service was officially launched and the sand track was 
nominally opened to motorized traffic (RZBW, 1992, p. 216). The 
county of Charklik then received its first motorized vehicles: one Soviet 
GAZ-69 four-wheel drive and one Liberation Truck (解放车, Jiefangche). 
As the road was crucial to provisioning Charklik and to securing access 
to the Tarim River, along which military farms were set up, over the next 
decade further rounds of roadworks were undertaken (RZBW, 1992, p. 
219). 
The first centrally orchestrated attempt to upgrade this connection 
was launched in the mid-1960s, when the road was incorporated into 
the Third Front construction drive, which assured the influx of some 
central funding (XJSBW, 1998, p. 157; YDBW, 1993, p. 174).12 In 1966, 
a survey team proposed a new route for the planned 3.5 m-wide road, 
positioned more favourably in relation to the river courses, and designed 
for a daily capacity of one hundred Liberation Trucks. Most of its length 
was to receive a gravel and saline soil surface (XWZDBW, 1998, pp. 
110–11). However, despite a vigorous start, construction soon stag-
nated. In practice, many more maintenance stations, bridges and drains 
than planned were necessary. Moreover, gravel that was to be trans-
ported from a site 70 km distant turned out to be unreachable in a terrain 
without roads. The fact that the commencement of construction coin-
cided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), and thus 
increased difficulties in finding construction workers, further compli-
cated the picture. Facing a looming failure, road engineers spontane-
ously changed construction strategy and decided to build sections of the 
Fig. 2. Map of southern Xinjiang, © James DeGrand.  
12 Third Front construction aimed at establishing an industrial, scientific and 
technological base away from China’s coast and land borders, and to prepare 
the country for combat by improving its transport infrastructures. 
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road out of bricks, which could be produced locally (XJSBW, 1998, p. 
158). Kilns were thus hastily built and, as the construction proceeded, 
thousands of trees growing along the lower Tarim River – mainly pop-
lars, tamarisks and saxauls – were felled to heat the ovens. The roughly 
100 km brick road has since been praised in local annals as a brilliant 
example of drawing on indigenous materials and knowledge in modern 
road construction (XJSBW, 1998, p. 159). In terms of its environmental 
ramifications, however, the decimation of the forests growing along the 
Tarim still reverberates throughout the whole of southeast Xinjiang. The 
felling of the forests, through which the road was actually built for its 
protection from the sun, wind and sand, also had disastrous conse-
quences for its further maintenance.13 
Through the 1970s, the desert road was in the process of assuming 
shape in some sections, while simultaneously disappearing in others. 
This ephemeral existence is perhaps best reflected by its description in 
Police News (Zhu, 2013, p. 79) as ‘the marks of wheel-ruts that were 
somewhat reminiscent of a road but at the same time were not really a 
road’ (似路非路的车辙印, silu feilu de chezheyin). In spite of its ephemeral 
materiality, in the 1980s the desert road was classified as a section of the 
no. 218 national highway and its enhanced administrative status 
materialized in asphalt, with which some sections were gradually paved 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the single-layer asphalt surface had basi-
cally disintegrated after a few years and the road largely resumed its 
sand and stone existence. A Han research participant from Charklik, who 
has travelled this road regularly for work over the past twenty-five 
years, recalled the journey in the 1990s: ‘When the bus from [Char-
klik] arrived in Korla everyone and everything was covered in sand dust. 
You could not see anything through the windows, they were covered 
with dust, and the passengers looked like they were made of dust (土人, 
turen)’.14 
The bumpy and dusty materiality of the road changed dramatically 
in the early 2000s, with further professionalization of road construction 
and the increased investment that arrived in Xinjiang following the 
launch of the Open Up the West programme (see Fig. 4). The road was 
then asphalted for the first time along its whole length. Although the 
asphalt surface often heats up to more than 60 �C on summer days and is 
associated with a high death toll due to the increased speed of travel, all 
my Uyghur, Han and Hui/Dungan research participants who inhabit 
dusty settlements and are used to gravel-sand tracks enjoy the new 
bodily comfort of mobility afforded by asphalt. Zhang, a Han woman in 
her fifties, and Sun, another Han woman in her seventies, both raised in 
the 34th military farm, narrated the changes as follows: 
Agnieszka: How was it here when you were young? 
Sun: At the beginning [in the 1960s], there were no trees in the settlement. 
When we came, at first we lived in simple huts built of dried bricks 
(tuzhang), there were no burnt bricks (kuangzhuang) back then. 
Zhang: The other thing that changed is transport – it got so much easier. 
First, they paved the main [desert] road, and then this road that goes into 
our settlement. Earlier there was such deep dust (tu) that you walked in it 
up to your knees. And now? Look! In a couple of years the state will build 
an expressway here! 
Fig. 3. The national highway no. 218 between the 34th military farm and Charklik. Photo: Author, 2012.  
13 http://www.chinahighway.com/news/2004/76961.php. 14 Fieldwork interview, Korla, summer 2015. 
A. Joniak-Lüthi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Political Geography 78 (2020) 102122
7
Agnieszka: We are in the middle of a desert, not many people live here, 
why would you need an expressway? 
Zhang and Sun, nearly in unison: There will be so many people coming! 
Korla is a central transport node. People travelling there … will all be 
passing through here! 
(Fieldwork interview, winter 2015) 
Zhang and Sun, and many other inhabitants of the military farms, 
consider themselves in pole position to profit from the future ‘flows’ that 
they see increasing year on year. In the early 2010s, when the desert 
road was reconstructed and the road leading eastwards from Charklik 
was asphalted, the asphalt brought about a tenfold increase in the 
number of 30þ tonne trucks on the road from the previous 200–300 to 
2,000–3,000 a day (Zhu, 2013). The road currently carries the bulk of 
trucks transporting goods between inner China, Xinjiang and Xinjiang’s 
western borders, where the goods are reshuffled onto trucks taking them 
to Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Without toll gates 
and weight-control stations, and also largely sans police presence due to 
the unbearable climate, the road is favoured by truck drivers who mostly 
travel by night to avoid the sun and heat. Following the upgrade of the 
road and the increase in traffic, the roadside catering industry is also 
growing, wherever water is made available. While a few Uyghur res-
taurants and shops exist, the majority of the simple hostels, car repair 
workshops and restaurants that cluster along the desert road are run by 
Han Chinese and Hui/Dungan migrants from other parts of Xinjiang, and 
from other parts of China. These cater predominantly to Han and Hui 
truck drivers and Han passengers on long-distance buses who come to 
southern Xinjiang in search of seasonal work in agriculture, extractive 
industries and construction. 
As the flows along the road increase, the roadside is also used by state 
agencies to create a sort of cinematic show of power for the people 
sitting in cars, buses and trucks for many hours, as they watch the 
landscape. The Chinese state not only simply marks its presence through 
roads, but also attempts to attach certain attributes to this presence. A 
Uyghur man from Korla who has regularly travelled along the desert 
road since the mid-1990s pointed this out to me, saying: ‘Earlier, mili-
tary farms were deeper in the desert, some kilometres away from the 
road. You couldn’t see them. Now they build their representative 
buildings along the road: the multistorey houses, police stations, mon-
uments, fancy squares decorated with flowers which need constant 
watering. They build along the road to demonstrate their presence and 
power. This is how I see it’ (Fieldwork interview, summer 2016) (see 
Fig. 5). 
As the roadside undergoes a significant redecoration, the Chinese 
central government is placing growing expectations on the desert road 
which, together with the link eastwards, should form one of the trunk 
connections in the prospective Economic Belt.15 At the same time, the 
topography and climate have proven to be powerful adversaries to 
government plans and road constructors, especially since the riparian 
forest along the lower Tarim was brought to the verge of extirpation in 
the 1970s due to the felling of trees for road construction, and the 
parallel over-draining of the Tarim for irrigated cotton agriculture. 
Strong winds from the northeast, which blow on more than half the days 
in the year, bringing dusty weather and sandstorms, further complicate 
government plans. Despite huge changes in road materiality, when the 
sandy wind blows the road disappears from view, just as it did twenty or 
seventy or a hundred years ago. In spite of the progress in construction 
technology and materials, which has been impressive and which can be 
experienced bodily on the road, an unmaintained highway would soon 
disappear in this sandy topography. Frost heave, seasonal floods and the 
combined forces of sand, salt and sun continue working towards its 
disintegration. Today, maintenance of the desert road includes sand 
clearing, regular renewal of sand-fixing reed grids and watering of 
vegetation shelterbelts, among many other things.16 Nevertheless, all 
road maintenance measures are contingent on the Tarim River, the only 
supply of water in this region of Xinjiang. However, the Tarim is also the 
source of water for the cotton agriculture in the desert, the main crop 
produced by the military farms. Due to overdraining by the farms in the 
1970s, the riparian ecosystem in which the road was built for protection 
was dangerously close to collapse throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It 
was in this tense context that a billion-dollar project was launched in 
2000, as discussed in the following section. 
3. The road, the river, the trees 
The Tarim River, on which the roads as well as the oases in the 
northern and eastern part of Taklamakan desert depend for existence, is 
China’s longest inland watercourse and once had a length of 1,321 km. 
The Tarim is primarily fed by glacial- and snow-melt, and precipitation 
from the Tengri Tagh/Tianshan Mountains. However, the river basin 
itself, which comprises most of southern Xinjiang, is characterized by an 
extremely arid continental climate, with annual precipitation of 20–50 
mm and a potential evaporation of about 2,500–3,000 mm (Aishan 
et al., 2013, p. 156). Since the 1950s, when the Chinese government 
Fig. 4. The road connecting Charklik with the Qinghai Province to the east. 
Photo: Author, 2016. 
Fig. 5. Monument celebrating the pioneers of the 34th military farm erected at 
the roadside in the central settlement of the farm, facing the road. In the 
background, newly-built apartment houses along the main street leading into 
the settlement. Photo: Author, 2016. 
15 Together with the northern link via the Gansu corridor.  
16 Because maintenance work is lonely, maintenance stations along the road 
are run by married couples forming ‘husband-wife stations’ (夫妻站, fuqi zhan). 
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launched politically and ecologically controversial projects of 
large-scale Han Chinese settlement, land reclamation and irrigated 
cotton agriculture in southern Xinjiang, water consumption has soared. 
Within fifty years, the amount of water used for irrigation increased 
exponentially from 5 to 20.2 billion m3 (Chen, Ye, & Shen, 2011, pp. 
264–6). 
As water was diverted to large-scale agriculture and to support the 
quickly growing Han population along the upper reaches of the river, 
less and less of it reached the main course and, in the early 1970s, the 
last 320 km of the Tarim desiccated – precisely the section of the river 
along which the desert road was built. In the aftermath of the lower 
Tarim’s desiccation, wind erosion and desertification grew in the area, 
and the groundwater level dropped by 10–12 m, making it unreachable 
for plants (Chen et al., 2011, p. 264; Aishan et al., 2013, p. 156; Li, Chen, 
Zhang, & Xia, 2009). This resulted in the dying out of the riparian forest, 
which in the past formed a 5–10 km-wide belt along the river in which 
communication lines have nestled for centuries. The size of the forest 
shrunk from around 54,000 ha in the 1950s to a mere 7,300 ha in the 
late 1990s (Zhang, Wu, Wang, & Li, 2010, p. 45). Due to the reduction in 
trees, with their soil stabilization and water retention properties, the 
already vulnerable desert road was now even more frequently buried by 
sand at almost 200 locations.17 So, the dead trees laid bare the fragility 
of connectivity in this corner of Xinjiang. 
To restore the river and the trees, and thus assure the existence of the 
road and the military farms along it, the central state launched a bold 
engineering project of Ecological Water Diversion (生态输水, shengtai 
shushui). Between 2000 and 2012, nearly 11 billion RMB (1.7 billion 
USD) was invested in this project to divert water from Baghrash/Bosi-
teng Lake at the northern tip of the desert road directly to the lower 
Tarim, with the aim of recharging groundwater up to the level where the 
natural flora could be revitalized (Li et al., 2009, p. 533). The biannual 
water releases have indeed led to partial recovery of the damaged forests 
and many trees, after nearly thirty years showing no signs of life, became 
green again – an event that a Han road maintenance worker from 
Charklik described as ‘a wonder’ (see Figs. 6 and 7). 
The Tarim Management Office – the agency that coordinates the 
project – celebrates the Ecological Water Diversion project as a victory 
for the ecologically sensible state, boasting that the forests have recov-
ered and improved, the salinity of groundwater and desertification 
decreased, and the problem of sand encroaching onto the road ‘has 
basically been solved’ (基本得到解决, jiben dedao jiejue).18 What remains 
outside of the government discourse but is discussed by Xinjiang Uyghur 
and Han scientists, and by the Uyghur and Han inhabitants of roadside 
settlements, is that overall water consumption in the upper and middle 
reaches of Tarim has not been reduced and thus desiccation is, in fact, 
increasing on a wider scale. The partial restoration of the river and the 
riparian forests has only been possible through a parallel significant 
reduction of the water body in Lake Baghrash, which will likely be 
empty by 2030, if not sooner (Li et al., 2009, p. 534). 
4. For whom does the water flow? 
Han and Uyghur scientists, with the latter especially often censoring 
their research and publications (Joniak-Lüthi, 2016b), argue that water 
management of the Tarim and the Water Diversion project have laid 
bare a severe conflict between agriculture and ecological conservation, 
and between humans and nature contending for limited water resources 
(Chen et al., 2011, pp. 264, 269). However, similar to the criticism of the 
Anthropocene understood as a product of an unspecified ‘humanity’, 
also in Xinjiang it is not undefined ‘humans’ who have brought about the 
current environmental predicament. Rather, the Tarim has been drained 
to an enormous degree by large-scale agriculture, the oil industry and 
the hydro-power industry, all of which are dominated by the Han. 
Moreover, the notion of a unitary ‘nature’ when applied to the situation 
where a huge lake is drained to restore a river that was previously 
drained for cotton agriculture equally exceeds the simplistic human-
s–nature binary used by Chinese scientists diplomatically to avoid 
spelling out the names of the doers. What we rather see in southern 
Xinjiang is that multiple state institutions, agendas and interests tread 
on each other’s toes in competition over what little water is available. 
Without the Tarim River and the trees that feed on it, both the desert 
road and the military farms cannot be sustained. As the road became a 
part of president Xi Jinping’s Silk Road Economic Belt vision in 2013, 
the paucity of water also means that this vision will not be possible to 
sustain. Hence, the poplar and tamarisk forests, the river, the road, the 
military farms, state security, the economy and China’s plans for 
Eurasian connectivity all intertwine here in relations of simultaneous 
interdependence and competition. 
The growing stakes that the Chinese state has in the desert road 
currently depend on a highly uncertain contract between the govern-
ment that funds the Ecological Water Diversion project and the restored 
poplars, which are expected to provide an ecosystem service (生态系统 
Fig. 6. Euphrates poplars together with reed grids stuck in the sand should 
keep the sand from encroaching onto the road. Photo: Author, 2011. 
Fig. 7. An idyllic view of Tarim, when the water flows. Photo: Author, 2011.  
17 http://www.tahe.gov.cn/zhuanti/sszt/bj.html. 
18 http://www.tahe.gov.cn/zhuanti/sszt/bj.html. 
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务, shengtai xitong fuwu) of protecting the state-built infrastructure.19 
However, even at the extremely high capital and ecological costs as are 
currently the case, the capacity of the trees to do this, and thus the ca-
pacity of the road to perform as the major link in the prospective Eco-
nomic Belt in a long-term perspective, remains questionable. The search 
for ways to restore the riparian ecosystem in which earlier roads found 
protection from the desert is restrained by a number of powerful and 
apparently unquestionable political imperatives. In the tradition of the 
early Communist strategists, the government appears determined to 
encourage Han settlement and maintain military farms along the Tarim 
and along the major traffic routes. The government is also determined to 
carry on resource extraction, dam the few rivers for ‘green’ energy 
production and continue urban expansion and infrastructure construc-
tion. As southern Xinjiang is a geopolitically central and resource-rich 
but restive region, reduction of water use for any of these activities, 
with each of them expanding the Han Chinese presence in this violence- 
ridden area, is politically non-negotiable. Thus, the competition over 
water between military farms, PetroChina, China Railway Engineering 
Corporation, the army and the Forestry, Water Management, Road and 
Transportation Bureaus continues, and so does the instrumental 
approach to ecosystems as though they were contained and discon-
nected wholes. 
The increased attention devoted to the desert road, and the current 
construction of the railway parallel to it, inscribe themselves in the 
narrative of facilitated circulation and flows advertised by China as the 
main purpose of the emerging Silk Road Economic Belt. Zooming back in 
on southeast Xinjiang reveals that the gap between the discourse of flows 
and the social-ecological context in which these flows should be taking 
place is potentially large. 
5. Conclusion 
Infrastructure construction attracts attention. In this article I argue 
that it is just as important to focus on the mundane life of roads, when 
the necessity to maintain things becomes visible, and the social 
complexity pertaining to any feat of infrastructure comes to light. While 
constructing 1 km of paved road worldwide costs on average about 
900,000 USD (Archondo-Callao, 2000), the maintenance costs of 
sand-fixing grids along the desert highway in southern Xinjiang ran to 
nearly 1 million USD per kilometre over ten years (Fieldwork material, 
Charklik 2015). Combined with the costs of upkeep of the asphalt and 
the roadbed, repairs to drip irrigation systems and regular sand clearing, 
ongoing maintenance costs are massively higher than those for initial 
construction. Concurrently, as demonstrated above, even with huge 
financial investment and concomitant high ecological costs, long-term 
connectivity along the desert road is still not secured. The difficulty of 
disciplining southern Xinjiang’s terrain to comply with the state agenda 
manifests in the fact that this huge, strategically pivotal, resource-rich 
and volatile region is today linked with inner China by only one direct 
road via Qinghai province and another more roundabout route through 
eastern Xinjiang and Gansu. 
Steven Jackson emphasizes the importance of discussing repair as a 
way to deconstruct ‘seemingly unassailable systems’ such as market, 
capital and modernity. ‘To forget repair is to risk … granting [such 
systems] a power and permanence they may not … deserve’ (Jackson, 
2015b). Rephrasing Jackson’s postulation, I argue that by not paying 
attention to decay and maintenance we might be granting the BRI a 
power that it may not, or at least not yet, deserve. Amid the currently 
booming interest in the BRI, which has produced a large and constantly 
growing number of geopolitical and foreign policy analyses of its 
potentialities and limitations (Aoyama, 2016; Bai & Wang, 2014; 
Blanchard & Flint, 2017; CBRI, 2017; Hu, Ma, & Yan, 2014; Sidaway and 
Chih, 2017), I suggest ethnographic zooming in on transport in-
frastructures that should carry the vision of the Economic Belt and a 
consideration of their ambiguous complexity. Research on China-built 
infrastructures in Africa (Nielsen, 2012) demonstrates that the objec-
tives of Chinese road construction cannot be captured in any simple 
functionalist argument. Construction may not aim at establishing con-
nectivity, and maintenance at upholding such connectivity, both rather 
being part of larger business dependencies, rhizomatic loyalty entan-
glements, political agendas, export of surplus labour and attempts to 
boost domestic production. Therefore, ethnographic research is neces-
sary to study what actually happens on the ground, that is, where 
normative ideas become entangled in social relations that transform the 
original intentions, often unrecognizably, and where grand strategies 
disintegrate into situated social practice. 
The history of the desert road underlines that construction and decay 
are two sides of the same coin, and that they have always alternated in 
quick succession in southern Xinjiang. The idea of a connection across 
this part of the Tarim Basin has been quite resilient over the centuries. 
Yet, the actual caravan trails have always dynamically adjusted to 
changing political regimes and to the fluid topography of moving sand, 
ephemeral lakes, meandering rivers and eroding mountains. In contrast 
to the earlier tracks made by human feet and animal hooves, the desert 
road of today appears fixed in the terrain by its asphalt. However, the 
lifespan of such material in this climate is short. And the road will shift 
again, or perhaps it will even be abandoned when the desert expands 
and the people emigrate. The desert road is thus a lens to focus attention 
on the inherent fragility of roads in regions like the Sino–Inner Asian 
borderlands. This fragility is implicated in the dynamically changing 
social relations between the ecosystems, humans, materials, state 
agendas and capital, and radiates onto other infrastructures, such as 
pipelines or oil extraction installations, which depend on roads for ac-
cess and maintenance. 
In the case of the desert road, the costly attempts to revitalize the 
poplar forests reveal that the vulnerability of human infrastructure is 
recognized by the Chinese central state, as is the inability of people to 
effectively sustain it in the long run. Thus, the state has attempted to 
restore the river and the trees to the degree necessary to provide a 
deeper-level ‘nature infrastructure’, in which the road and the settle-
ments can be embedded. The case at hand demonstrates how an 
ecosystem is first destroyed for large-scale agriculture and then recre-
ated to the detriment of another ecosystem to maintain transport in-
frastructures. In so doing, the article makes the case for considering 
infrastructure maintenance as at times necessary, desired and indeed 
vital to keeping our world going, but at other times as a contested and 
also violent work of care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). In countries where 
state agendas and investment in infrastructure are as tightly bound 
together as they are in China, the work of maintenance is necessarily 
also part of processes aiming at the reproduction of the political, even if 
the outcomes of this work are never straightforward. This demands 
paying attention not so much to the general question of whether things 
are maintained, but rather to how maintenance is conducted, what 
exactly is being maintained, for what purposes and at what and whose 
costs (Joniak-Lüthi, 2019). 
The desert road is fragile: not only do the materials out of which it is 
built erode quickly but also the ‘nature culture’ in which it is embedded 
is in a process of constant flux. The uncertainty of the deal based on 
draining a lake in order to refill a river to maintain the state infra-
structure raises broader questions of how – and especially how long – 
connectivity along this and similar roads in the westward arc of the 
Economic Belt can be sustained, and what connections and fissures will 
come into being afterwards. 19 An ecosystem service refers to ‘the set of ecosystem functions that are useful 
to humans’ (Kremen, 2005, p. 468). It is argued that ecosystem services have a 
monetary value and economic potential which must be recognized by 
governments. 
A. Joniak-Lüthi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Political Geography 78 (2020) 102122
10
Declaration of competing interest 
None. 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank the editors of this special issue and the three 
anonymous reviewers for taking the time to think through my ideas and 
provide their extremely helpful feedback. I would also like to thank the 
Swiss National Science Foundation and the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research for the financial support of my research in 
Xinjiang between 2011 and 2016. Last but not least, I would like to say a 
heartfelt thank you to my research participants and academic collabo-
rators in Xinjiang. It weights heavily on my heart to know that most of 
them have been illegally detained, but I still hope that a future in which 
we will be able to sit together and hold debates while swallowing tonnes 
of kawap and naan will come again, even if it seems so improbable today. 
References 
Aishan, T., et al. (2013). Monitoring the hydrological and ecological response to water 
diversion in the lower reaches of the Tarim River, Northwest China. Quaternary 
International, 311, 155–162. 
Alff, H. (2016). Getting stuck within flows: Limited interaction and peripheralization at 
the China-Kazakhstan border. Central Asian Survey, 35(3), 369–386. 
Anand, N. (2018). A public matter: Water, hydraulics, biopolitics. In N. Anand, A. Gupta, 
& H. Appel (Eds.), The promise of infrastructure (pp. 155–172). Durham: Duke 
University Press.  
Aoyama, R. (2016). “One belt, one road”: China’s new global strategy. Journal of 
Contemporary East Asian Studies, 5(3), 3–22. 
Archondo-Callao, R. (2000). Roads works costs per km. World Bank Reports: http://s 
iteresources.worldbank.org/INTROADSHIGHWAYS/Resources/338993-11224968 
26968/kmcosts.pdf. 
Bai, Y., & Wang, S. (2014). Sichou zhilu jingjidai de zongshen beijing yu diyuan zhanlüe 
[In-depth analysis of Silk Road Economic Belt’s background and geostrategy]. Gaige 
[Reform], 3, 64–73. 
Barnes, J. (2017). States of maintenance: Power, politics, and Egypt’s irrigation 
infrastructure. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 35(1), 146–164. 
Barry, A. (2013). Material politics: Disputes along the pipeline. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.  
Bell�er-Hann, I., Ces�aro, M. C., Harris, R., & Smith Finley, J. (Eds.). (2007). Situating the 
Uyghurs between China and central Asia. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate.  
Blanchard, J.-M. F., & Flint, C. (2017). Special section: The geopolitics of China’s 
Maritime Silk road initiative. Geopolitics, 22(2). 
Blu, K. I. (1996). “Where do you stay at?”: Homeplace and community among the 
lumbee. In S. Feld, & K. H. Basso (Eds.), Senses of place (pp. 197–228). Santa F�e, New 
Mexico: School of American Research Press.  
Bovingdon, G. (2010). The Uyghurs: Strangers in their own land. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
Campbell, J. M. (2012). Between the material and the figural road: The incompleteness 
of colonial geographies in amazonia. Mobilities, 7(4), 481–500. 
Carse, A. (2017). An infrastructural event: Making sense of Panama’s drought. Water 
Alternatives, 10(3), 888–909. 
CBRI. (2017). China’s belt and road initiative: Views from along the Silk road. Asia 
Policy, 24, 65–122. 
Chan, K. W., & Zhang, L. (1999). The hukou system and rural–urban migration in China: 
Processes and changes. The China Quarterly, 160, 818–855. 
Chen, Y., Ye, Z., & Shen, Y. (2011). Desiccation of the Tarim river, Xinjiang, China, and 
mitigation strategy. Quaternary International, 244, 264–271. 
Chu, J. Y. (2014). When Infrastructures attack: The workings of disrepair in China. 
American Ethnologist, 41(2), 351–367. 
Clarke, M. (2017). The belt and road initiative: China’s new grand strategy? Asia Policy, 
24, 71–79. 
Cliff, T. (2012). The partnership of stability in Xinjiang: State–society interactions 
following the july 2009 unrest. The China Journal, 68, 79–105. 
Clifford, J. (1992). Travelling cultures. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, & P. Treichler (Eds.), 
Travelling cultures (pp. 96–116). New York: Routledge.  
Cooley, A. (2015). New Silk route or classic developmental cul-de-sac? The prospects and 
challenges of China’s OBOR initiative, PONARS Eurasia. Policy Memo, 372. July 
2015 http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/new-silk-route-or-classic-developmen 
tal-cul-de-sac. 
Cresswell, T., & Merriman, P. (Eds.). (2011). Geographies of mobilities: Practices, spaces, 
subjects. Farnham: Ashgate.  
Dalakoglou, D. (2010). The road: An ethnography of the Albanian–Greek cross-border 
motorway. American Ethnologist, 37(1), 132–149. 
Denis, J., & Pontille, D. (2014). Maintenance work and the performativity of urban 
inscriptions: The case of Paris subway signs. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 32, 404–416. 
Flower, J. M. (2004). A road is made: Roads, temples, and historical memory in ya’an 
county, sichuan. Journal of Asian Studies, 63(3), 649–685. 
Graham, S., & Thrift, N. (2007). Out of order: Understanding repair and maintenance. 
Theory, Culture & Society, 24(3), 1–25. 
Harvey, P. (2018). Infrastructures in and out of Time: The Promise of Roads in 
Contemporary Peru. In N. Annand, A. Gupta, & H. Appel (Eds.), The promise of 
infrastructure (pp. 80–101). Durham: Duke University Press.  
Harvey, P., Bruun Jensen, C., & Morita, A. (2017). Introduction: Infrastructural 
complications. In P. Harvey, C. Bruun Jensen, & A. Morita (Eds.), Infrastructures and 
social complexity: A companion (pp. 1–22). London: Routledge.  
Harvey, P., & Knox, H. (2015). Roads: An Anthropology of infrastructure and expertise. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.  
Hetherington, K. (Ed.). (2019). Infrastructure, environment, and life in the Anthropocene. 
Durham: Duke University Press.  
Hu, A., Ma, W., & Yan, Y. (2014). “Sichouzhilu jingjidai”: Zhanlüe neihan, dingwei he 
shixian lujing [Silk Road Economic Belt: Strategic intentions, positioning and 
implementation]. Xinjiang Shifan Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Xinjiang Normal 
University], 35(2), 1–5. 
Jackson, S. L. (2015). Dusty roads and disconnections: Perceptions of dust from unpaved 
mining roads in Mongolia’s south gobi province. Geoforum, 66, 94–105. 
Jackson, S. (2015). Repair: Theorizing the contemporary. Cultural Anthropology. htt 
ps://culanth.org/fieldsights/720-repair.  
Joniak-Lüthi, A. (2016). Roads in China’s Borderlands: Interfaces of spatial 
representations, perceptions, practices, and knowledges. Modern Asian Studies, 50(1), 
118–140. 
Joniak-Lüthi, A. (2016). Disciplines, silences and fieldwork methodology under 
surveillance. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie [Journal of Anthropology], 141, 197–214. 
Joniak-Lüthi, A. (2019). Maintaining whose Road? In F. Martínez, & P. Laviolette (Eds.), 
Repair, brokenness, breakthrough: Ethnographic responses (pp. 145–148). New York and 
Oxford: Berghahn.  
Kernaghan, R. (2012). Furrows and walls, or the legal topography of a frontier road in 
Peru. Mobilities, 7(4), 501–520. 
Kobi, M. (2016). Constructing, creating and contesting cityscapes: A socio-anthropological 
approach to urban transformation in southern Xinjiang, people’s Republic of China. 
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.  
Kremen, C. (2005). Managing ecosystem services: What do we need to know about their 
ecology? Ecology Letters, 8, 468–479. 
Li, X. (2015). Silk Road Initiatives to connect people’s hearts. China Daily European Weekly 
(on-line edition), 17 April 2015. 
Li, Y., Chen, Y., Zhang, Y., & Xia, Y. (2009). Rehabilitating China’s largest inland river. 
Conservation Biology, 23(3), 531–536. 
Mostowlansky, T. (2017). Azan on the moon: Entangling modernity along Tajikistan’s pamir 
highway. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Murton, G. (2017). Bordering spaces, practising borders: Fences, roads and 
reorientations across a Nepal–China borderland. South Asia: Journal of South Asian 
Studies, 40(2), 239–255. 
NDRC; National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (Ed.). (2015). Vision and 
Actions on jointly building Silk road economic belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk road. 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. 
Nielsen, M. (2012). Roadside inventions: Making time and money work at a road 
construction site in Mozambique. Mobilities, 7(4), 467–480. 
Puig de la Bellacasa, M. (2017). Matters of care: Speculative ethics in more than human 
worlds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Reeves, M. (2014). Border work: Spatial lives of the state in rural central Asia. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.  
Rezakhani, K. (2010). The road that never was: The Silk road and trans-eurasian 
exchange. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 30(3), 
420–433. 
Rippa, A. (2017). Centralising peripheries: The belt and road initiative and its role in the 
development of the Chinese borderlands. International Journal of Business 
Anthropology, 7(1), 1–21. 
RZBW, Ruoqiangxian Zhi Banzuan Weiyuanhui (Ed.). (1992). Ruoqiangxian zhi, Xinjiang 
weiwu’er zizhiqu difangzhi congshu. Urumchi: Xinjiang Daxue Chubanshe.  
Schwenkel, C. (2015). Spectacular infrastructure and its breakdown in socialist vietnam. 
American Ethnologist, 42(3), 520–534. 
Selwyn, T. (2001). Landscapes of separation: Reflections on the symbolism of by-pass 
roads in Palestine. In B. Bender, & M. Winer (Eds.), Contested landscapes: Movement, 
exile and place (pp. 225–240). Oxford, New York: Berg.  
Sidaway, J. D., & Chih, Yuan Woon (2017). Chinese narratives on “one belt, one road” 
(一带一路) in geopolitical and imperial contexts. The Professional Geographer, 69(4), 
591–603. 
Strebel, I., Bovet, A., & Philippe, S. (2019). Repair work ethnographies: Revisiting 
breakdown, relocating materiality. Palgrave Macmillan.  
Thum, R. (2014). The sacred routes of Uyghur history. Cambridge, MA, and London: 
Harvard University Press.  
Toops, S. (2013). Spatial results of the 2010 census of Xinjiang. In Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the association of asian studies, san diego. 
Tsing, A. (2005). Friction: An ethnography of global connection. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press.  
Uteng, T. P., & Cresswell, T. (Eds.). (2008). Gendered mobilities. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Woodworth, M. (2012). Frontier boomtown urbanism in ordos, inner Mongolia 
autonomous region. CrossCurrents, 1(1), 74–101. 
Xinhua Agency. (2015). Yidai yilu hexinqu mingque: Xinjiang cheng qianyan [The core areas 
of the BRI have been revealed: Xinjiang assumes the forward position]. Retrieved from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-04/01/c_1114842365.htm. 
XJSBW, Xinjiang Jiaotong Shizhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (Ed.). (1998). Xinjiang gonglu shi, 
xiandai gonglu [the history of Xinjiang roads, contemporary roads], vol. 2 in the series 
A. Joniak-Lüthi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Political Geography 78 (2020) 102122
11
zhongguo gonglu jiaotongshi congshu [the history of Chinese roads and transportation]. 
Beijing: Renmin Jiaotong Chubanshe.  
XWZCZ, Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu Chengli 50 Zhounian Chouweihui Bangongshi and 
Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu Tongjiju (Ed.). (2005). Xinjiang wushinian 1955–2005 
[Xinjiang: Fifty years 1955–2005]. Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.  
XWZDBW, Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui and Xinjiang 
Tongzhi Jiaotong Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (Ed.). (1998). Xinjiang tongzhi, di 48 
juan, gonglu jiaotong zhi [Xinjiang annals, vol. 48, road and transportation annals]. 
Urumchi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe.  
XWZJSBW, Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu Jiaotong Shizhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (Ed.). 
(1992). Xinjiang gonglu jiaotong shi, jindai gonglu, jindai gonglu yunshu [the history of 
Xinjiang’s road transportation. Modern roads and modern road transport], vol. 1 in the 
series zhongguo gonglu jiaotongshi congshu [the history of Chinese roads and 
transportation]. Beijing: Renmin Jiaotong Chubanshe.  
YDBW, Yulixian Difangzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (Ed.). (1993). Yulixianzhi, Xinjiang 
weiwu’er zizhiqu difangzhi congshu. Urumchi: Xinjiang Daxue Chubanshe.  
Yu, H. (2017). Motivation behind China’s ‘one belt, one road’ initiatives and 
establishment of the asian infrastructure investment bank. Journal of Contemporary 
China, 26(105), 353–368. 
Zenz, A. (2018). ‘Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude’: China’s 
political re-education campaign in Xinjiang. Central Asian Survey. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997. 
Zenz, A., & Leibold, James (2017). Xinjiang’s rapidly evolving security state. China Brief, 
17(4). https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/. 
Zhang, J., Wu, G., Wang, Q., & Li, X. (2010). Restoring environmental flows and 
improving riparian ecosystem of Tarim River. Journal of Arid Land, 2(1), 43–50. 
Zhu, X. (2013). Shijie zui chang zhuanqi gonglu [The world’s longest brick road]. Renmin 
Gong’an, (18–19), 76–79. 
A. Joniak-Lüthi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
